Anniversaries offer the perfect opportunity to revisit the past and commemorate historical events. This month’s fortieth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the repression of the Prague Spring is proving to be no different. Media outlets and pundits have been looking to the heady of the Cold War for insights into the world that was, and the world that is now. Russia’s invasion of Georgia has been rendered all the more dramatic in light of the violence that was perpetuated four decades ago. It is a time for soul-searching for both the Czech and Russian peoples.
For countries who were not engaged directly in the conflict, remembering the Soviet invasion serves as an occasion to recall the actions they took on behalf of the victims of the invasion; the Czech intellectuals and innocent citizens who saw their dreams of blossoming democracy dashed and who fled in fear for their lives. Canada offered resettled 12,000 Czech refugees left the country. Most never returned home, choosing to put down new roots and make Canada their new home. As such, this week’s anniversary would seem to be a golden opportunity for self-congratulation and some heartfelt back patting on a job well done. The reality is that the decision to take in these refugees was far more self-serving than the government of the day, and historians since, have been willing to acknowledge.
In 1968, Pierre Trudeau was a fresh, new prime minister, determined to place his distinctive mark on Canada and the world. Shortly after assuming office, his government launched an ambitious and comprehensive foreign policy review that was to chart a distinct course for Canadian diplomacy. It involved re-prioritizing Canada’s international efforts internationally and finding a unique place for Canada in a world that had been wracked with the geopolitical divisions of the cold war for several years. It was obvious from the moment Trudeau assumed office that he was far more willing to accommodate the Soviets than many of his predecessors. The Soviet invasion came as a real blow and raised fears that, in fact, the world was about to plunge into another dark period of heightened tensions. But with a major foreign-policy review underway, one which might lead to the reduction of Canadian troop levels in Europe, officials in Ottawa were ill-prepared to respond to the crisis diplomatically. As a result, according to government documents, the Liberals decided to adopt a policy of being as “unprovocative as possible.” The strategy was to avoid embarrassing the Soviets into any further actions while condemning the initial invasion.
This situation began to change when there appeared to be a growing humanitarian crisis in Austria, where many of the 150,000 refugees escaped. Here was a major dilemma: what would happen if Canada offered to resettle refugees? Would the demand be overwhelming? Would the Soviets be upset if mass numbers of refugees fled to the west? What to do?
History loomed large in. In 1956, in the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution, Canada offered refuge to 37,000 people who fled the violence. In so doing, Mackenzie King’s government exploited the crisis to score propaganda points against the Soviet Union. The refugees were publicly praised for their bravery and commonly referred to as “freedom fighters”, noble warriors in the battle against communism. But Trudeau was trying to accommodate the Soviet Union. Not isolate it.
Economic interests proved to be the deciding factor. As refugees flowed into Vienna, reports from Canadian officials highlighted how talented they were. Young, well-educated…ideal candidates for resettlement. This attention to the quality of the refugees, whom government documents referred to as “good material”, was not all that surprising. Canada’s immigration policies shifted dramatically in the 1960s. The 1967 Immigration Act confirmed the importance of immigration to Canada’s labour needs by providing a points system for determining eligible migrants to Canada and stressed skills, education and adaptability as the main point-getters. The Czech refugees were deemed to be ideal candidates. But how could the government get the labourers it desired, without revealing that it was exploiting a humanitarian crisis for its own ends? The government needed a strategy that would avoid encouraging a mass exodus, which would upset the Soviets and liberal elements in Czechoslovakia, and yet would allow it to obtain the high skill refugees it so brazenly coveted. Canadian policy had to be selective, designed to facilitate the movement of only particular refugees.
On September 6, the government announced a limited program whereby it would issue visas for those Czechs interested in migrating to Canada according to the “relaxed standards traditionally offered to refugees.” Normal requirements for sponsorship, potential employment and financial assistance were waived. The government also organized a special parliamentary delegation that included representatives from the Canada Council, the National Research Council and other professional bodies, to go to Vienna and assist with the recruitment and selection of refugees. The first group of two hundred refugees to arrive in Canada was composed of medical doctors, dentists, fifteen engineers, and two television set designers. Quite a coup. The historian Reg Whitaker has noted, that given the fact that it cost the government less than $1000 to resettle each refugee, “they were probably quite pleased with the return on their investment.
On this anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, many victims will be remembered. In Canada, the only victim was the romantic notion of what it meant to be a refugee. What the 1968 Czech refugee movement revealed is how easy it is for governments to manipulate humanitarian crises for their own ends and that is a legacy that remains with us today.
Originally written in August, 2008.
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